{{Header}}
{{title|title=
anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor
}}
{{#seo:
|description=Preventing Tor over Tor for Tor Browser, TorChat and others.
}}
{{intro|
Preventing Tor over Tor for Tor Browser, TorChat and others.
}}
= Introduction =
There is only 1 Tor daemon (long-running process, program) running on {{project_name_gateway_long}}.
When starting Tor Browser in {{project_name_workstation_long}}, the integrated Tor, which comes with the Tor Browser Bundle, will not be started.
Therefore, there are no duplicate Tor daemons running in {{project_name_long}} by default, except in the case of [[#Limitations|some corner cases]].
= Why? =
See [[Tips_on_Remaining_Anonymous#Prevent_Tor_over_Tor_scenarios|Prevent Tor over Tor Scenarios]].
[https://forums.whonix.org/t/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor-considered-useless/8471 Rationale on implementation details, SocksSocket vs TCP, environment variables vs settings file]
= Implementation =
== Environmental Variable Adjustments ==
* [https://github.com/Whonix/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/etc/X11/Xsession.d/20torbrowser /etc/X11/Xsession.d/20torbrowser
]
* [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/libexec/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh /usr/libexec/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/torbrowser.sh
]
== Providing Virtual Tor Package ==
Implemented in [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor], [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/debian/control {{Code|debian/control}}]. The package uses the Provides: tor
fieldSee "7.5 Virtual packages - Provides" on https://www.debian.org/doc/debian-policy/ch-relationships.html, which should avoid any conflicts in case upstream releases a higher version of Tor. This won't work for packages that depend on an explicit version of Tor (such as TorChat). This is non-ideal since, for example, the {{Code|torchat}} package will install Tor. However, this is still acceptable because of the following additional implementations.
== Tor Binary Replacement ==
Tor's binary was replaced (dpkg-diverted using config-package-dev) with dummy executables, so even if the real {{Code|tor}} package gets installed, it won't be automatically started.
* https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/bin/tor.anondist
* https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/sbin/tor.anondist
== systemd-socket-proxyd Listening Port Redirection ==
[https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/libexec/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/systemd-unit-files-generator Listening] using systemd-socket-proxyd
on the following listening ports:
* Tor's default listening ports. I.e.:
** system [[Tor]]'s SocksPort
s {{Code|127.0.0.1:9050}}, {{Code|127.0.0.1:9051}}, and
** [[Tor Browser]]'s SocksPort
s {{Code|127.0.0.1:9150}}, {{Code|127.0.0.1:9051}},
** [[Tor Messenger]]'s SocksPort
{{Code|127.0.0.1:9152}}
These are redirected to the gateway.
Also applies to ControlPort
s:
* Tor's 9051
* Tor Browser's 9151
These are redirected to Tor (actually control port filter proxy ([[onion-grater|onion-grater]]) on the gateway).
* and others, see [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/libexec/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/systemd-unit-files-generator full list].
* These listening ports are forwarded to {{project_name_gateway_short}}.
* This prevents the default Tor Browser, Tor Messenger, and/or Tor package by The Tor Project from opening these default ports, which will result in Tor failing to open its listening port and therefore exiting, thus preventing Tor over Tor.
TODO: describe
* systemd socket activation
* https://web.archive.org/web/20221128013446/https://phabricator.whonix.org/T357
== Unix Domain Socket File Redirection ==
Since Tor Browser, [[OnionShare]] ([https://cloud.githubusercontent.com/assets/156128/21556064/8ead0338-cdd2-11e6-918c-d4ca61724b52.png screenshot]) among more and more other applications require [https://forums.whonix.org/t/tor-browser-6-5a4-connectivity-broken-blocked-by-apparmor-profile-since-tbb-changed-to-sockssocket/3154 SocksSocket]
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/14272#comment:3
* https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/issues/20111#comment:5
, anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor is also providing:
* Tor Control Unix Domain Socket file: /var/run/tor/control
, which is redirected to Control Port Filter Proxy on {{project_name_gateway_short}}.
* [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/share/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/control.authcookie Tor Control Auth Cookie]: a functional /var/run/tor/control.authcookie
that works with [[Dev/onion-grater|onion-grater (Control Port Filter Proxy)]].
* Tor Socks Unix Domain Socket file: /var/run/tor/socks
that is redirected to {{project_name_gateway_short}} Tor port 9050
** [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/etc/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor.d/30_anon-dist.conf full list].
== Tor State File Creation ==
All required state files that Tor would normally create in /var/run/tor
and /var/lib/tor
are being created by [https://github.com/{{project_name_short}}/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/blob/master/usr/libexec/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/state-files /usr/lib/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/state-files].
== bindp ==
TODO: describe
* bindp
* https://forums.whonix.org/t/find-way-to-have-tor-ephermal-hidden-service-using-applications-in-whonix-workstation-bind-on-all-interfaces/18846
== socat ==
There are no socat
redirections by default in {{project_name_short}}.
Advanced setups such as [https://www.getmonero.org/resources/user-guides/cli_wallet_daemon_isolation_qubes_whonix.html Monero CLI Wallet/Daemon Isolation with {{q_project_name_long}}] are using things like EXEC
. From that example:
socat TCP-LISTEN:18081,fork,bind=127.0.0.1 EXEC:"qrexec-client-vm monerod-ws user.monerod"
systemd-socket-proxyd
does not support EXEC
, hence socat
is useful here.
= Limitations =
Not all arbitrary applications with their own Tor integration have their internal Tor disabled.
* Applications installed from Debian package sources and manually installed applications have the "lowest risk" of Tor over Tor / "highest chance" of anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor
being functional. If the application honors the common environment variable TOR_SKIP_LAUNCH=1
, then there should be no issue.
* Applications shipped through Flatpak: There is currently no technical approach for how anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor
could disable an application's internal Tor in the Flatpak chroot. This matters, for example, for [[OnionShare]] if installed from Flatpak. See [[Dev/OnionShare]].
* Applications shipped through AppImages: same as above.
= Debugging =
Run:
{{CodeSelect|code=
echo "$TOR_SOCKS_IPC_PATH"
}}
Should show the following:
/var/run/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/127.0.0.1_9150.sock---- Run: {{CodeSelect|code= echo "$TOR_CONTROL_IPC_PATH" }} Should show the following:
/var/run/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/127.0.0.1_9151.sockAlso, please run: {{CodeSelect|code= UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH=1 curl 127.0.0.1:9150 }} Should show the following:
Run a similar command:Tor is not an HTTP Proxy Tor is not an HTTP Proxy
It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as an HTTP proxy. This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy. Please configure your client accordingly.
See https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html for more information.
echo GET | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/var/run/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/127.0.0.1_9150.sockShould show the same as above. ----- Next one to try: {{CodeSelect|code= UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH=1 curl 127.0.0.1:9151 }} Should show the following:
510 Request filtered ...Run a similar command:
echo GET | socat - UNIX-CONNECT:/var/run/anon-ws-disable-stacked-tor/127.0.0.1_9151.sockShould show:
510 Request filtered= Debugging with curl = Trying to use
curl
rather than curl.anondist-orig
is a common mistake when debugging {{project_name_short}} network issues.
curl
is a symlink to curl.anondist-orig
. In turn, this symlinks to uwtwrapper
, which runs curl
under torsocks
. torsocks
then forces Tor to run on localhost
for stream isolation.
* The uwt
stream isolation wrapper must be circumvented or disabled.
* The command must be run under the user clearnet
.
In {{project_name_gateway_short}} or {{project_name_gateway_vm}}
[[Qubes|{{q_project_name_short}}]]:
'''1.''' Switch to user clearnet
:
{{CodeSelect|code=
sudo -su clearnet
}}
'''2.''' Circumvent the uwt
stream isolation wrapper by appending .anondist-orig
to curl
:
{{CodeSelect|code=
curl.anondist-orig exec
calls from the command output show the difference between running curl
with the uwtwrapper
both enabled and disabled.
'''Example 1'''
curl
is run with the uwtwrapper
enabled:
{{CodeSelect|code=
uwtwrapper_verbose=1 curl exec
calls. Only the latest (most recent) call matters, which shows torsocks
is prepended before running curl
:
exec torsocks /usr/lib/uwtexec something'''Example 2'''exec -a /usr/bin/curl /usr/bin/curl.anondist-orig
curl
is run with the uwtwrapper
disabled:
{{CodeSelect|code=
uwtwrapper_verbose=1 UWT_DEV_PASSTHROUGH=1 curl exec
calls, which show torsocks
does not get prepended before curl
. Since curl
does not run under torsocks
, local connections are not hindered, and there is no stream isolation:
exec /usr/lib/uwtexec'''The output from the previous commands establishes the following:''' *exec -a /usr/bin/curl /usr/bin/curl.anondist-orig
/usr/bin/curl
is symbolically linked to /usr/bin/curl.anondist-orig
. This demonstrates /usr/bin/curl.anondist-orig
is the actual (real) curl
binary.
* When /usr/bin/curl.anondist-orig
is run with the uwtwrapper
disabled, all uwt
logic is circumvented.
Users can either circumvent the uwt
stream isolation wrapper or disable it either permanently or temporarily.
Links:
* [[Stream_Isolation|Stream Isolation]]
* [[Stream_Isolation/Disable_Easy|Stream Isolation/Disable Easy]]
= Application Developers =
* [[Dev/Project_friendly_applications_best_practices|{{project_name_short}} friendly applications best practices]]
* [https://gitlab.torproject.org/legacy/trac/-/wikis/doc/Tor_friendly_applications_best_practices Tor friendly applications best practices]
= See Also =
* [[Redirect Whonix-Workstation Ports or Unix Domain Socket Files to Whonix-Gateway]]
= Footnotes =
{{reflist|close=1}}
{{Footer}}
[[Category:Design]]