WEBVTT 00:00.000 --> 00:05.000 . 00:05.000 --> 00:10.000 . 00:10.000 --> 00:14.000 . 00:14.000 --> 00:22.000 . 00:22.000 --> 00:27.000 . 00:27.000 --> 00:48.000 . 00:48.000 --> 00:50.000 . 00:50.000 --> 00:53.000 . 00:53.000 --> 00:58.000 . 00:58.000 --> 01:03.000 . 01:03.000 --> 01:08.000 . 01:08.000 --> 01:13.000 . 01:13.000 --> 01:18.000 . 01:18.000 --> 01:21.000 . 01:21.000 --> 01:26.000 . 01:26.000 --> 01:31.000 . 01:31.000 --> 01:36.000 . 01:36.000 --> 01:41.000 . 01:41.000 --> 01:46.000 . 01:46.000 --> 01:51.000 . 01:51.000 --> 01:56.000 . 01:56.000 --> 02:00.000 . 02:00.000 --> 02:04.000 . 02:04.000 --> 02:08.000 . 02:08.000 --> 02:12.000 . 02:12.000 --> 02:17.000 . 02:17.000 --> 02:22.000 . 02:22.000 --> 02:26.000 . 02:26.000 --> 02:30.000 . 02:30.000 --> 02:34.000 . 02:34.000 --> 02:38.000 . 02:38.000 --> 02:43.000 . 02:43.000 --> 02:48.000 . 02:48.000 --> 02:52.000 . 02:52.000 --> 02:56.000 . 02:56.000 --> 03:00.000 . 03:00.000 --> 03:05.000 . 03:05.000 --> 03:10.000 . 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flipping is a default, and it's a new tab. 10:59.000 --> 11:01.000 However, it's a familiar. 11:01.000 --> 11:06.000 It can not keep created attestation key. 11:06.000 --> 11:11.000 On the other hand, AWS Azure GCP can keep 11:11.000 --> 11:19.000 attestation key. 11:19.000 --> 11:26.000 However, we don't know that key is kept 11:26.000 --> 11:31.000 after boot. 11:31.000 --> 11:34.000 The estimation of secure boot also depends on 11:34.000 --> 11:36.000 crowd benders. 11:36.000 --> 11:42.000 AWS and Sakura cannot set secure boot. 11:42.000 --> 11:46.000 On the other hand, Azure and GCP can set 11:46.000 --> 11:50.000 as well as can change the status of secure boot. 11:50.000 --> 11:54.000 However, GCP can not. 11:54.000 --> 11:57.000 Okay. 11:57.000 --> 12:05.000 So, I investigate the status of TPN persistent keys. 12:05.000 --> 12:11.000 So, we can set endorsement key and attestation key 12:11.000 --> 12:16.000 to the number of memory of boot EPN. 12:16.000 --> 12:21.000 It can save after reboot, except Sakura, 12:21.000 --> 12:26.000 because Sakura is a merit EPN. 12:26.000 --> 12:31.000 But we cannot know that key is saved safely 12:31.000 --> 12:33.000 after power on. 12:33.000 --> 12:39.000 If you have answer, please tell me. 12:39.000 --> 12:43.000 So, from here, I want to talk about 12:43.000 --> 12:45.000 Internet experience feature. 12:45.000 --> 12:50.000 Internet experience has two types of measurement. 12:50.000 --> 12:56.000 MRTD, measurement of trust domain register. 12:56.000 --> 13:03.000 It keeps the value of TD BIF, trust domain 13:03.000 --> 13:04.000 battery hardware. 13:04.000 --> 13:09.000 On the other hand, RTMR, 13:09.000 --> 13:13.000 Lantang measurement registers. 13:13.000 --> 13:22.000 It protects the registers for RTMR. 13:22.000 --> 13:27.000 So, some component measured after boot power on. 13:27.000 --> 13:30.000 It works as TPN. 13:30.000 --> 13:37.000 Measurement component, and measure of software 13:37.000 --> 13:45.000 is listed in the table. 13:45.000 --> 13:49.000 So, this slide shows two useful, 13:49.000 --> 13:54.000 X. 13:54.000 --> 13:58.000 I got the most interesting result. 13:58.000 --> 14:04.000 On Azure, the measurement by MA, 14:04.000 --> 14:09.000 and TDX code paths are different. 14:09.000 --> 14:15.000 So, it's a lead paths, shows the lead paths, 14:15.000 --> 14:19.000 all that of hash number. 14:19.000 --> 14:26.000 So, I guess it is caused by a difference between TDX buzzer, 14:26.000 --> 14:29.000 because TDX, TDX buzzer, 14:29.000 --> 14:39.000 whole LTDX buzzer 5, over different order. 14:39.000 --> 14:42.000 Most of the interesting result is on Azure, 14:42.000 --> 14:48.000 RTMR shows all zero. 14:48.000 --> 14:55.000 On the other hand, GCP shows some values for RTMR, 14:55.000 --> 14:59.000 from zero to two. 14:59.000 --> 15:03.000 I think this reason is caused from the interface 15:03.000 --> 15:14.000 to get the body of MRTMR, RMTR, 15:14.000 --> 15:17.000 an intermediate register. 15:17.000 --> 15:22.000 So, because Azure does not apply the interface 15:22.000 --> 15:25.000 such as CIS from our SEPI, 15:25.000 --> 15:29.000 slash tables, slash data, slash CCEL. 15:29.000 --> 15:41.000 So, investigate the BTP and the Secular Boot status. 15:41.000 --> 15:48.000 Integrity DX, as well as Integrity DX use, 15:48.000 --> 15:53.000 slash TPM zero, or a test action interface. 15:53.000 --> 15:57.000 On the other hand, GCP use, slash TDX guest. 15:57.000 --> 16:02.000 It's a part by open source interface. 16:02.000 --> 16:12.000 And the situation with TPM and Secular Boot is same to set S&B. 16:12.000 --> 16:19.000 I also investigate the TPM positive keys on TDX. 16:20.000 --> 16:29.000 The situation is same to MD set S&B. 16:29.000 --> 16:33.000 Okay, I want to skip SGX. 16:33.000 --> 16:41.000 I open this slide, please check the data from the slide. 16:41.000 --> 16:45.000 I want to discuss, so the situation will be kept 16:45.000 --> 16:53.000 on Secular Boot, depend on, could have the vendor. 16:53.000 --> 17:03.000 So, only, I'm not sure it's only. 17:03.000 --> 17:13.000 So, it's not measured by SEPI remote attetation. 17:13.000 --> 17:32.000 TPM can measure, however, we can not trust BTP, 17:32.000 --> 17:35.000 or cost attention to William. 17:35.000 --> 17:42.000 And second question is, Interoperability. 17:42.000 --> 17:49.000 So, we can use confidential computing on each credit vendors. 17:49.000 --> 17:53.000 However, the attestation interface is different, 17:53.000 --> 18:00.000 and the result are changed, even if the CPE is same. 18:00.000 --> 18:03.000 The difference may cause interoperability problem, 18:03.000 --> 18:09.000 for example, it migrate to another credit vendors. 18:09.000 --> 18:13.000 So, conclusion. 18:13.000 --> 18:16.000 So, each credit has all each security policy, 18:16.000 --> 18:19.000 and affects the remote attestation. 18:19.000 --> 18:24.000 So, we think we need to understand a situation 18:24.000 --> 18:27.000 when we use confidential computing on credit. 18:27.000 --> 18:32.000 So, trust my guess, 18:32.000 --> 18:36.000 as well as the front of the MCCA, 18:36.000 --> 18:39.000 and I guess the attestation interface 18:39.000 --> 18:42.000 will be slushed-absorbed to TPM zero. 18:42.000 --> 18:45.000 That's all, thank you. 18:45.000 --> 18:52.000 Okay. 18:52.000 --> 18:55.000 So, very nice interesting work. 18:55.000 --> 18:57.000 So, I think this is kind of a negotiation 18:57.000 --> 18:59.000 that I just great with you, 18:59.000 --> 19:02.000 that basically you have the close source 19:02.000 --> 19:04.000 components and all that anyway. 19:04.000 --> 19:07.000 So, on the keyboard ones like that, 19:07.000 --> 19:09.000 the conclusion you have, 19:09.000 --> 19:12.000 so this point, the security policies that the vendors 19:12.000 --> 19:13.000 release. 19:13.000 --> 19:15.000 So, I think that's not good components of system, 19:15.000 --> 19:17.000 but on the slide 7, 19:17.000 --> 19:20.000 if you know there is a weak component of the system. 19:20.000 --> 19:25.000 So, there is a point number 2, 19:25.000 --> 19:27.000 you have standard level of attestation, 19:27.000 --> 19:29.000 without the case certificate. 19:29.000 --> 19:30.000 And here the issue is that, 19:30.000 --> 19:33.000 basically you are trusting everyone in the world, 19:33.000 --> 19:35.000 every server in the world that exists, 19:35.000 --> 19:37.000 can now create this attestation. 19:37.000 --> 19:39.000 And it is only secure, 19:39.000 --> 19:43.000 only in every server in the world is secure. 19:43.000 --> 19:44.000 No keys are the, 19:44.000 --> 19:48.000 no code is injected into the custody application environment. 19:48.000 --> 19:49.000 And this is very discreet. 19:49.000 --> 19:50.000 This leads to diversion attack. 19:50.000 --> 19:53.000 We have a paper, which I will just very briefly talk about. 19:53.000 --> 19:55.000 You might have, 19:55.000 --> 19:56.000 but the point in this, 19:56.000 --> 19:58.000 this is, 19:58.000 --> 19:59.000 security must, 19:59.000 --> 20:00.000 you are not, 20:00.000 --> 20:02.000 instead of trusting the cloud provider, 20:02.000 --> 20:05.000 which you have at least regulatory information, 20:05.000 --> 20:07.000 you are trusting everyone in the world, 20:07.000 --> 20:08.000 which is not good. 20:08.000 --> 20:11.000 And I don't think we should take this direction. 20:11.000 --> 20:12.000 Okay. 20:12.000 --> 20:14.000 I have to repeat the question. 20:14.000 --> 20:17.000 So my question is kind of a concern 20:17.000 --> 20:19.000 with this kind of expectations. 20:19.000 --> 20:20.000 Yeah. 20:20.000 --> 20:21.000 Yeah. 20:21.000 --> 20:23.000 You not only trust the cloud provider itself, 20:23.000 --> 20:27.000 you trust everyone in the world through the means of your, 20:27.000 --> 20:28.000 this tool. 20:28.000 --> 20:30.000 That's my concern. 20:30.000 --> 20:31.000 Yeah. 20:31.000 --> 20:33.000 Your question was, 20:33.000 --> 20:35.000 so, 20:35.000 --> 20:36.000 could I have to bend that? 20:36.000 --> 20:38.000 So, 20:38.000 --> 20:39.000 if, 20:39.000 --> 20:40.000 yeah, 20:40.000 --> 20:41.000 if, 20:41.000 --> 20:42.000 we make up, 20:42.000 --> 20:43.000 so, so, 20:43.000 --> 20:44.000 so, 20:44.000 --> 20:45.000 already, 20:45.000 --> 20:46.000 we need, 20:46.000 --> 20:47.000 to, 20:47.000 --> 20:48.000 opera, 20:51.000 --> 20:53.000 certificate, 20:53.000 --> 20:54.000 certificate itself. 20:54.000 --> 20:56.000 So, 20:56.000 --> 20:57.000 so, 20:57.000 --> 20:59.000 standard attestation, 20:59.000 --> 21:02.000 does not include the certificate, 21:02.000 --> 21:04.000 but it can get from, 21:05.000 --> 21:07.000 from homepage. 21:07.000 --> 21:09.000 The difference is, 21:09.000 --> 21:10.000 the difference is, 21:10.000 --> 21:12.000 attestation included, 21:12.000 --> 21:14.000 MPK certificate, 21:14.000 --> 21:15.000 or not. 21:15.000 --> 21:16.000 However, 21:16.000 --> 21:17.000 the, 21:17.000 --> 21:19.000 such certificate can be, 21:19.000 --> 21:20.000 can, 21:20.000 --> 21:21.000 can, 21:21.000 --> 21:22.000 can get from, 21:22.000 --> 21:23.000 uh, 21:23.000 --> 21:25.000 ship you bend us, for example. 21:25.000 --> 21:26.000 Yeah. 21:26.000 --> 21:28.000 So, 21:28.000 --> 21:29.000 uh, 21:29.000 --> 21:30.000 we can discuss something. 21:30.000 --> 21:31.000 Okay. 21:31.000 --> 21:32.000 That's, 21:33.000 --> 21:34.000 uh, 21:34.000 --> 21:35.000 just, 21:35.000 --> 21:36.000 identification. 21:36.000 --> 21:37.000 You say that, 21:37.000 --> 21:38.000 your wood, 21:38.000 --> 21:39.000 uh, 21:39.000 --> 21:40.000 state is mutable, 21:40.000 --> 21:41.000 does it mean that, 21:41.000 --> 21:42.000 you are still in set-up model, 21:42.000 --> 21:44.000 and you can inject new custom keys. 21:44.000 --> 21:45.000 Oh, 21:45.000 --> 21:46.000 okay. 21:46.000 --> 21:47.000 The, 21:47.000 --> 21:48.000 the question is, 21:48.000 --> 21:49.000 uh, 21:49.000 --> 21:51.000 the BM status is changed, 21:51.000 --> 21:52.000 after, 21:52.000 --> 21:53.000 mutable. 21:53.000 --> 21:54.000 Mutable. 21:54.000 --> 21:55.000 Uh, 21:55.000 --> 21:57.000 is it that one? 21:57.000 --> 21:58.000 Yeah. 21:58.000 --> 21:59.000 Yeah. 22:00.000 --> 22:01.000 Mm-hmm. 22:01.000 --> 22:02.000 Uh-hmm. 22:02.000 --> 22:03.000 Okay. 22:03.000 --> 22:05.000 Hmm. 22:05.000 --> 22:06.000 You can samples right, 22:06.000 --> 22:09.000 uh, 22:09.000 --> 22:11.000 uh, 22:11.000 --> 22:12.000 you potem Get out of the middle. 22:12.000 --> 22:13.000 Boom. 22:13.000 --> 22:15.000 Uh, 22:15.000 --> 22:17.000 you can set-up, 22:17.000 --> 22:19.000 yeah, yeah, yeah. 22:19.000 --> 22:21.000 Yeah, yeah, yeah. 22:21.000 --> 22:23.000 Okay. 22:23.000 --> 22:25.000 We're great to be EM. 22:25.000 --> 22:27.000 Our greatoo to be EM, right? 22:27.000 --> 22:32.000 and you can do it both when you can create them very much, you can create it through the setup mode, right? 22:32.000 --> 22:33.000 Thank you, thank you. 22:33.000 --> 22:42.000 So on AWS, we can set a secure boot. However, we have to prepare keys for secure boot. 22:45.000 --> 22:47.000 Okay, let's see. 22:47.000 --> 22:53.000 You have a set-plus, like, to get to the conclusion that the VTBM is not drastically good. 22:53.000 --> 22:55.000 If you look at it, it can look at it. 22:55.000 --> 22:57.000 Oh, it's open-not. 22:57.000 --> 23:04.000 Like, I think you have to select this open-not, or you actually have to buy a new VTBM. 23:04.000 --> 23:06.000 Is this right? 23:06.000 --> 23:08.000 Yes, we have VTBM, exactly. 23:08.000 --> 23:14.000 And why come to the conclusion that the VTBM is not structured? 23:14.000 --> 23:17.000 Oh, okay. 23:17.000 --> 23:21.000 The question was VTBM. 23:21.000 --> 23:29.000 So I think this failure is changed. 23:29.000 --> 23:32.000 This figure is wrong. 23:32.000 --> 23:35.000 Let's know as runs on VTBM. 23:35.000 --> 23:37.000 VTBM too. 23:37.000 --> 23:42.000 And open H shape runs on VTBM. 23:42.000 --> 23:49.000 And VTBM 0 is measured and target for remote attestation. 23:49.000 --> 23:56.000 So, we can know the VTBM is used. 23:56.000 --> 24:08.000 However, current status, we don't know the hash barring open HCl. 24:08.000 --> 24:12.000 But open H is the same story, but we know... 24:12.000 --> 24:13.000 Yeah, yeah. 24:13.000 --> 24:15.000 Open H is the same situation. 24:15.000 --> 24:23.000 However, we make... 24:23.000 --> 24:28.000 Oh, open H, we can measure, okay. 24:28.000 --> 24:30.000 I'm sorry, no, we don't have time. 24:30.000 --> 24:32.000 Thank you so much. 24:32.000 --> 24:33.000 Thank you. 24:33.000 --> 24:37.000 Thank you.