<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<cvrfdoc xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1" xmlns:cvrf="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/cvrf/1.1">
	<DocumentTitle xml:lang="en">An update for sed is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</DocumentTitle>
	<DocumentType>Security Advisory</DocumentType>
	<DocumentPublisher Type="Vendor">
		<ContactDetails>openeuler-security@openeuler.org</ContactDetails>
		<IssuingAuthority>openEuler security committee</IssuingAuthority>
	</DocumentPublisher>
	<DocumentTracking>
		<Identification>
			<ID>openEuler-SA-2026-2282</ID>
		</Identification>
		<Status>Final</Status>
		<Version>1.0</Version>
		<RevisionHistory>
			<Revision>
				<Number>1.0</Number>
				<Date>2026-05-09</Date>
				<Description>Initial</Description>
			</Revision>
		</RevisionHistory>
		<InitialReleaseDate>2026-05-09</InitialReleaseDate>
		<CurrentReleaseDate>2026-05-09</CurrentReleaseDate>
		<Generator>
			<Engine>openEuler SA Tool V1.0</Engine>
			<Date>2026-05-09</Date>
		</Generator>
	</DocumentTracking>
	<DocumentNotes>
		<Note Title="Synopsis" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">sed security update</Note>
		<Note Title="Summary" Type="General" Ordinal="2" xml:lang="en">An update for sed is now available for openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</Note>
		<Note Title="Description" Type="General" Ordinal="3" xml:lang="en">Sed is a non-interactive command-line text editor. A stream editor is used to per-form basic text transformations on an input stream (a file or input from a pipeline).

Security Fix(es):

When sed is invoked with both -i (in-place edit) and --follow-symlinks, the function open_next_file() performs two separate, non-atomic filesystem operations on the same path: 
1. resolves symlink to its target and stores the resolved path for determining when output is written,
2. opens the original symlink path (not the resolved one) to read the file. 
Between these two calls there is a race window. If an attacker atomically replaces the symlink with a different target during that window, sed will: read content from the new (attacker-chosen) symlink target and write the processed result to the path recorded in step 1. This can lead to arbitrary file overwrite with attacker-controlled content in the context of the sed process.


This issue was fixed in version 4.10.(CVE-2026-5958)</Note>
		<Note Title="Topic" Type="General" Ordinal="4" xml:lang="en">An update for sed is now available for master/openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4/openEuler-24.03-LTS/openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next/openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1/openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2/openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP3/openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4.

openEuler Security has rated this update as having a security impact of low. A Common Vunlnerability Scoring System(CVSS)base score,which gives a detailed severity rating, is available for each vulnerability from the CVElink(s) in the References section.</Note>
		<Note Title="Severity" Type="General" Ordinal="5" xml:lang="en">Low</Note>
		<Note Title="Affected Component" Type="General" Ordinal="6" xml:lang="en">sed</Note>
	</DocumentNotes>
	<DocumentReferences>
		<Reference Type="Self">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2282</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="openEuler CVE">
			<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/en/security/cve/detail/?cveId=CVE-2026-5958</URL>
		</Reference>
		<Reference Type="Other">
			<URL>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5958</URL>
		</Reference>
	</DocumentReferences>
	<ProductTree xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/prod/1.1">
		<Branch Type="Product Name" Name="openEuler">
			<FullProductName ProductID="openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="aarch64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-debuginfo-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-debuginfo-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-debugsource-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-debugsource-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="src">
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.src.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="x86_64">
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-debuginfo-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-debuginfo-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-debugsource-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-debugsource-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
		<Branch Type="Package Arch" Name="noarch">
			<FullProductName ProductID="sed-help-4.8-8" CPE="cpe:/a:openEuler:openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4">sed-help-4.8-8.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm</FullProductName>
		</Branch>
	</ProductTree>
	<Vulnerability Ordinal="1" xmlns="http://www.icasi.org/CVRF/schema/vuln/1.1">
		<Notes>
			<Note Title="Vulnerability Description" Type="General" Ordinal="1" xml:lang="en">When sed is invoked with both -i (in-place edit) and --follow-symlinks, the function open_next_file() performs two separate, non-atomic filesystem operations on the same path: 
1. resolves symlink to its target and stores the resolved path for determining when output is written,
2. opens the original symlink path (not the resolved one) to read the file. 
Between these two calls there is a race window. If an attacker atomically replaces the symlink with a different target during that window, sed will: read content from the new (attacker-chosen) symlink target and write the processed result to the path recorded in step 1. This can lead to arbitrary file overwrite with attacker-controlled content in the context of the sed process.


This issue was fixed in version 4.10.</Note>
		</Notes>
		<ReleaseDate>2026-05-09</ReleaseDate>
		<CVE>CVE-2026-5958</CVE>
		<ProductStatuses>
			<Status Type="Fixed">
				<ProductID>openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4</ProductID>
			</Status>
		</ProductStatuses>
		<Threats>
			<Threat Type="Impact">
				<Description>Low</Description>
			</Threat>
		</Threats>
		<CVSSScoreSets>
			<ScoreSet>
				<BaseScore>2.1</BaseScore>
				<Vector>AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X</Vector>
			</ScoreSet>
		</CVSSScoreSets>
		<Remediations>
			<Remediation Type="Vendor Fix">
				<Description>sed security update</Description>
				<DATE>2026-05-09</DATE>
				<URL>https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-2282</URL>
			</Remediation>
		</Remediations>
	</Vulnerability>
</cvrfdoc>