<noinclude>__NOINDEX__</noinclude>
<div class="scroll-table">
{| class="wikitable" style="background-color: #fff;text-align: center"

!
! Most iPhone / Android devices <ref name=most-mobile>
Most iPhone / Android phones that are sold by mobile carriers or manufacturers have locked bootloaders. These phones are often packaged with spyware installed by default, which cannot be removed. There may be rare exceptions to this rule, hence "most" and not "all". These exceptions are not the point which shall be made in this comparison. See the "Libre Android" column for what is theoretically possible.
</ref>
! "Libre Android" <ref>
There is no "Libre Android" at time of writing. It's only a concept to illustrate a point. There is no "perfect" Android distribution. GrapheneOS has verified boot but [https://archive.ph/2sYur root access is refused in default builds]. Replicant allows root access, but no references were found that Replicant makes use of verified boot yet. It's not relevant to pick any specific Android distribution for the sake of making the point "iPhone and Android Level Security for Linux Desktop Distributions" no specific Android distribution was chosen for this compassion. A "perfect" Android distribution checking all "green yes" is possible in theory. It doesn't exist due to policy decisions. (GrapheneOS vs root in default builds vs device selection / features.) There are no technical reasons for non-existence. See also this [[Mobile_Operating_System_Comparison|Overview of Mobile Projects, that focus on either/and/or security, privacy, anonymity, source-available, Freedom Software.]].
</ref>
! Linux Desktop Distributions
! {{project_name_short}} Development Goals

|-
! Upgrades do not require vendor
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! User freedom to replace operating system
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Administrator capabilities (root) not refused
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Custom operating system (bootloader unlock) not refused
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! No trouble or void device warranty from software changes (rooting or bootloader unlock)
| {{No}} <ref>
https://www.howtogeek.com/240417/does-rooting-or-unlocking-void-your-android-phones-warranty/
</ref>
| {{No}} <ref name=hardware-limitation/>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! No user freedom restrictions
| {{No}} <ref>
[[Miscellaneous_Threats_to_User_Freedom#mobile_devices_restrictions|Mobile Devices Restrictions]]
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! No backdoors included
| {{No}} <ref>
[[Mobile_Phone_Security#Mobile_Devices_Backdoors_in_Most_Phones_Tablets_Etc|Mobile Devices Backdoors in Most Phones Tablets Etc]]
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! No spyware included in operating system
| {{No}} <ref>
[[Mobile_Phone_Security#Data_Harvesting_by_Most_Phones|Data Harvesting by Most Phones]]
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! No culture of freemium applications that spy on users in appstores
| {{No}} <ref>
[[Mobile_Phone_Security#Data_Harvesting_by_Most_Apps|Data Harvesting by Most Apps]]
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Culture of [[Freedom Software]] in appstores
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Freedom Software
| {{No}} <ref>Comes with a lot proprietary software installed by default.</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Compromised application cannot access data of other applications
| {{Yes}} <ref name=exploitedapp>
That would require an exploit.

In comparison, a compromised application on the Linux desktop running under <code>user</code> has full access to all information which that user has access to, including all files, keystrokes and so on. The exception is when [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mandatory_access_control mandatory access control (MAC)] is in use and successfully confines that application.
</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref name=exploitedapp />
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! [[Malware_and_Firmware_Trojans#Malware|Malware]] on a compromised system cannot easily gain root
| {{Yes}} <ref name=malware-gain-root>
Occasionally there are exploits that allow applications to gain root, but as time passes more of these vulnerabilities are being fixed.
</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref name=malware-gain-root />
| {{No}} <ref>
On the Linux desktop the process of Preventing [[Malware and Firmware Trojans|malware]] from [[Root#Prevent_Malware_from_Sniffing_the_Root_Password|Sniffing the Root Password]] is cumbersome and unpopular. Therefore any compromised application on the Linux desktop could lead to root compromise. This in turn might compromise the bootloader, kernel, or even hardware. It is difficult to detect [[Malware and Firmware Trojans|malware]], remove a [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit rootkit] and [[Malware and Firmware Trojans#Valid_Compromise_Indicators_versus_Invalid_Compromise_Indicators|indicators of compromise are rare]].
</ref>
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Reasonable resistance against system wide rootkit
| {{Yes}} <ref name=verifiedboot>Through verified boot.</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref name=verifiedboot/>
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! [[Verified_Boot#Hash_Check_all_Files_at_Boot|Verified Boot]]
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! [https://forums.whonix.org/t/kernel-recompilation-for-better-hardening/7598 Hardened Kernel]
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| some
| {{Yes}}

|-
! [https://github.com/roddhjav/apparmor.d Full System MAC Policy]
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}

|-
! Internal storage can reasonably easily be removed and mounted elsewhere for the purpose of data recovery or hunting malware / rootkits.
| {{No}} <ref>
This is a hardware limitation. Internal storage is a chip and soldered. Removal is an operation which most repair shops are incapable of performing. Even if removed, it's not easy to find a device which can read the device without booting from it. Perhaps it could be booted from in another device, but that would be beside the point. If the operating system is unbootable due to software issues, it will also be unbootable elsewhere. If malware analysis is the goal, then no code from the suspected infected storage device should ever be executed.<br />

Even worse if full disk encryption was used as per next table entry.<br />

* [https://android.stackexchange.com/questions/176276/replace-internal-memory/176277 replace internal memory]
* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mobile_device_forensics#Forensic_desoldering forensic desoldering]

Hence, not "reasonably easily" possible.<br />
<br />
Quote [https://android.stackexchange.com/questions/28296/how-to-fully-backup-non-rooted-devices How to fully backup non-rooted devices?]:

<blockquote>
For 4.0+ devices there is a solution called "adb backup".

Note: This only works for apps that do not disallow backup! Apps that disallow backup are simply ignored when creating a backup using this way.
</blockquote>

Information from [https://stackoverflow.com/questions/29442630/copy-full-disk-image-from-android-to-computer Copy full disk image from Android to computer] does not work for non-rooted / non-rootable devices.

Taking a non-rooted Android device with GrapheneOS, contributed by a user.

<pre>
$ adb devices
List of devices attached
xxxxxxxxxxx    device

$ adb root
adbd cannot run as root in production builds

$ adb shell
walleye:/ $ ls
ls: ./init.zygote64_32.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./init.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./init.usb.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./ueventd.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./init.zygote32.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./init: Permission denied
ls: ./cache: Permission denied
ls: ./init.environ.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./persist: Permission denied
ls: ./postinstall: Permission denied
ls: ./init.usb.configfs.rc: Permission denied
ls: ./metadata: Permission denied
acct apex bin bugreports charger config d data debug_ramdisk default.prop dev dsp etc firmware lost+found mnt odm oem proc product product_services res sbin sdcard storage sys system vendor
1|walleye:/ $ sudo ls
/system/bin/sh: sudo: inaccessible or not found
127|walleye:/ $ su
/system/bin/sh: su: inaccessible or not found
127|walleye:/ $
</pre>

<pre>
walleye:/dev/block $ ls -lah
total 0
drwxr-xr-x  6 root   root       2.4K 1970-07-03 11:40 .
drwxr-xr-x 18 root   root       3.9K 2020-05-26 15:41 ..
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root   root         37 1970-07-03 11:40 bootdevice -> /dev/block/platform/soc/1da4000.ufshc
drwxr-xr-x  2 root   root       1.6K 1970-07-03 11:40 by-name
brw-------  1 root   root   252,   0 1970-07-03 11:40 dm-0
brw-------  1 root   root   252,   1 1970-07-03 11:40 dm-1
brw-------  1 root   root     7,   0 1970-07-03 11:40 loop0
brw-------  1 root   root     7,   8 1970-07-03 11:40 loop1
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  80 1970-07-03 11:40 loop10
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  88 1970-07-03 11:40 loop11
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  96 1970-07-03 11:40 loop12
brw-------  1 root   root     7, 104 1970-07-03 11:40 loop13
brw-------  1 root   root     7, 112 1970-07-03 11:40 loop14
brw-------  1 root   root     7, 120 1970-07-03 11:40 loop15
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  16 1970-07-03 11:40 loop2
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  24 1970-07-03 11:40 loop3
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  32 1970-07-03 11:40 loop4
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  40 1970-07-03 11:40 loop5
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  48 1970-07-03 11:40 loop6
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  56 1970-07-03 11:40 loop7
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  64 1970-07-03 11:40 loop8
brw-------  1 root   root     7,  72 1970-07-03 11:40 loop9
drwxr-xr-x  2 root   root         80 1970-07-03 11:40 mapper
drwxr-xr-x  3 root   root         60 1970-07-03 11:40 platform
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   0 1970-07-03 11:40 ram0
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   1 1970-07-03 11:40 ram1
brw-------  1 root   root     1,  10 1970-07-03 11:40 ram10
brw-------  1 root   root     1,  11 1970-07-03 11:40 ram11
brw-------  1 root   root     1,  12 1970-07-03 11:40 ram12
brw-------  1 root   root     1,  13 1970-07-03 11:40 ram13
brw-------  1 root   root     1,  14 1970-07-03 11:40 ram14
brw-------  1 root   root     1,  15 1970-07-03 11:40 ram15
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   2 1970-07-03 11:40 ram2
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   3 1970-07-03 11:40 ram3
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   4 1970-07-03 11:40 ram4
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   5 1970-07-03 11:40 ram5
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   6 1970-07-03 11:40 ram6
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   7 1970-07-03 11:40 ram7
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   8 1970-07-03 11:40 ram8
brw-------  1 root   root     1,   9 1970-07-03 11:40 ram9
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   0 1970-07-03 11:40 sda
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   1 1970-07-03 11:40 sda1
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  10 1970-07-03 11:40 sda10
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  11 1970-07-03 11:40 sda11
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  12 1970-07-03 11:40 sda12
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  13 1970-07-03 11:40 sda13
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  14 1970-07-03 11:40 sda14
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  15 1970-07-03 11:40 sda15
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   0 1970-07-03 11:40 sda16
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   1 1970-07-03 11:40 sda17
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   2 1970-07-03 11:40 sda18
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   3 1970-07-03 11:40 sda19
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   2 1970-07-03 11:40 sda2
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   4 1970-07-03 11:40 sda20
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   5 1970-07-03 11:40 sda21
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   6 1970-07-03 11:40 sda22
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   7 1970-07-03 11:40 sda23
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   8 1970-07-03 11:40 sda24
brw-------  1 root   root   259,   9 1970-07-03 11:40 sda25
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  10 1970-07-03 11:40 sda26
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  11 1970-07-03 11:40 sda27
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  12 1970-07-03 11:40 sda28
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  13 1970-07-03 11:40 sda29
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   3 1970-07-03 11:40 sda3
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  14 1970-07-03 11:40 sda30
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  15 1970-07-03 11:40 sda31
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  16 1970-07-03 11:40 sda32
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  17 1970-07-03 11:40 sda33
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  18 1970-07-03 11:40 sda34
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  19 1970-07-03 11:40 sda35
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  20 1970-07-03 11:40 sda36
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  21 1970-07-03 11:40 sda37
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  22 1970-07-03 11:40 sda38
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  23 1970-07-03 11:40 sda39
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   4 1970-07-03 11:40 sda4
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  24 1970-07-03 11:40 sda40
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  25 1970-07-03 11:40 sda41
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  26 1970-07-03 11:40 sda42
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  27 1970-07-03 11:40 sda43
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  28 1970-07-03 11:40 sda44
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  29 1970-07-03 11:40 sda45
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   5 1970-07-03 11:40 sda5
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   6 1970-07-03 11:40 sda6
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   7 1970-07-03 11:40 sda7
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   8 1970-07-03 11:40 sda8
brw-------  1 root   root     8,   9 1970-07-03 11:40 sda9
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  16 1970-07-03 11:40 sdb
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  17 1970-07-03 11:40 sdb1
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  32 1970-07-03 11:40 sdc
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  33 1970-07-03 11:40 sdc1
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  48 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  49 2020-05-26 15:41 sdd1
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  58 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd10
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  59 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd11
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  60 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd12
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  61 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd13
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  62 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd14
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  63 2020-05-26 15:42 sdd15
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  30 2020-05-26 15:41 sdd16
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  31 2020-05-26 15:41 sdd17
brw-------  1 root   root   259,  32 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd18
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  50 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd2
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  51 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd3
brw-rw----  1 system system   8,  52 2020-05-26 15:48 sdd4
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  53 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd5
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  54 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd6
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  55 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd7
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  56 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd8
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  57 1970-07-03 11:40 sdd9
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  64 1970-07-03 11:40 sde
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  65 1970-07-03 11:40 sde1
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  66 1970-07-03 11:40 sde2
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  67 1970-07-03 11:40 sde3
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  68 1970-07-03 11:40 sde4
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  69 1970-07-03 11:40 sde5
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  80 1970-07-03 11:40 sdf
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  81 1970-07-03 11:40 sdf1
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  82 1970-07-03 11:40 sdf2
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  83 1970-07-03 11:40 sdf3
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  84 1970-07-03 11:40 sdf4
brw-------  1 root   root     8,  85 1970-07-03 11:40 sdf5
drwx------  2 root   root         40 1970-07-03 11:40 vold
brw-------  1 root   root   253,   0 2020-05-26 15:41 zram0
</pre>

<pre>
$ adb shell
walleye:/ $ mount
/dev/root on / type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
tmpfs on /dev type tmpfs (rw,seclabel,nosuid,relatime,size=1851548k,nr_inodes=462887,mode=755)
devpts on /dev/pts type devpts (rw,seclabel,nosuid,noexec,relatime,mode=600)
proc on /proc type proc (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,gid=3009,hidepid=2)
sysfs on /sys type sysfs (rw,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
selinuxfs on /sys/fs/selinux type selinuxfs (rw,relatime)
tmpfs on /mnt type tmpfs (rw,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=1851548k,nr_inodes=462887,mode=755,gid=1000)
tmpfs on /apex type tmpfs (rw,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=1851548k,nr_inodes=462887,mode=755)
/dev/block/sdd3 on /persist type ext4 (rw,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noatime,data=ordered)
/dev/block/dm-1 on /vendor type ext4 (ro,seclabel,relatime)
none on /dev/cpuctl type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpu)
none on /acct type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuacct)
none on /dev/cpuset type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,cpuset,noprefix,release_agent=/sbin/cpuset_release_agent)
none on /dev/stune type cgroup (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,schedtune)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.tzdata@290000000 type ext4 (ro,seclabel,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.tzdata type ext4 (ro,seclabel,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.runtime@1 type ext4 (ro,seclabel,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.runtime type ext4 (ro,seclabel,relatime)
debugfs on /sys/kernel/debug type debugfs (rw,seclabel,relatime)
none on /config type configfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime)
tracefs on /sys/kernel/debug/tracing type tracefs (rw,seclabel,relatime)
/dev/block/sde4 on /metadata type ext4 (rw,sync,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noatime,discard,data=ordered)
/dev/block/sda28 on /firmware type vfat (ro,context=u:object_r:firmware_file:s0,relatime,uid=1000,gid=1000,fmask=0337,dmask=0227,codepage=437,iocharset=iso8859-1,shortname=lower,errors=remount-ro)
tmpfs on /storage type tmpfs (rw,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noexec,relatime,size=1851548k,nr_inodes=462887,mode=755,gid=1000)
/dev/block/sda45 on /data type ext4 (rw,seclabel,nosuid,nodev,noatime,noauto_da_alloc,resgid=1065,errors=panic,stripe=4096,data=ordered)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.conscrypt@290000000 type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.conscrypt type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.media@290000000 type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.media type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.media.swcodec@290000000 type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.media.swcodec type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.resolv@290000000 type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
/dev/root on /apex/com.android.resolv type ext4 (ro,seclabel,nodev,relatime)
adb on /dev/usb-ffs/adb type functionfs (rw,relatime)
mtp on /dev/usb-ffs/mtp type functionfs (rw,relatime)
ptp on /dev/usb-ffs/ptp type functionfs (rw,relatime)
/data/media on /mnt/runtime/default/emulated type sdcardfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime,fsuid=1023,fsgid=1023,gid=1015,multiuser,mask=6,derive_gid,default_normal)
/data/media on /storage/emulated type sdcardfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime,fsuid=1023,fsgid=1023,gid=1015,multiuser,mask=6,derive_gid,default_normal)
/data/media on /mnt/runtime/read/emulated type sdcardfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime,fsuid=1023,fsgid=1023,gid=9997,multiuser,mask=23,derive_gid,default_normal)
/data/media on /mnt/runtime/write/emulated type sdcardfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime,fsuid=1023,fsgid=1023,gid=9997,multiuser,mask=7,derive_gid,default_normal)
/data/media on /mnt/runtime/full/emulated type sdcardfs (rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,noatime,fsuid=1023,fsgid=1023,gid=9997,multiuser,mask=7,derive_gid,default_normal)
pstore on /sys/fs/pstore type pstore (rw,seclabel,relatime)
</pre>
</ref>
| {{No}} <ref name=hardware-limitation>Same issue as Most iPhone / Android devices since inheriting the same hardware limitations.</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref>
Computer (non-mobile) hardware is much more flexible. Storage devices can be removed from a computer, then added to another computer as a secondary disk. When booting from an installation assumed to be uncompromised (by [the same] malware), a search for malware can be performed on the other disk without executing any code, reducing risk of infection for the booted disk. This kind of procedure can be performed reasonably easily by most repair shops, and even non-technical people can do this without the need for soldering.
</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop>Same as Linux Desktop Distributions.</ref>

|-
! Internal storage can reasonably easily be decrypted once transferred to a different device if password is known.
| {{No}} <ref>
The masterkey is not stored on the internal storage. [https://source.android.com/security/encryption/full-disk#storing_the_encrypted_key It is stored in hardware.] which is even harder to extract.<br />
<br />
Note: "masterkey" here does not mean "backdoor". This is normal for most Linux desktop distributions offering full disk encryption. The masterkey is stored somewhere. When entering the password at boot with Linux desktop full disk encryption enabled, what gets decrypted is not actually the disk but the masterkey. This is then used to decrypt the disk, which is also called luks header. The advantage of the masterkey is that changing the disk encryption password is possible without having to re-encrypt the whole disk. (<code>cryptsetup-reencrypt</code>).<br />
<br />
It is perhaps possible to dump the masterkey if the phone can still be started and can be rooted. There are no instructions how to do so. Hence, not "reasonably easily".
</ref>
| {{No}} <ref>Same issue as Most iPhone / Android devices. Limitation of hardware, not software.</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref>Same as Linux Desktop Distributions.</ref>

|-
! Can reasonably easily boot from external hard drive, ignoring internal harddrive for purpose of data recovery or hunting malware / rootkits.
| {{No}}
| {{No}} <ref name=hardware-limitation/>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! Can reasonably easily create full data backup.
| {{No}} <ref>See next point below.</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! Can reasonably easily create full data backup of any app when device is rooted with Titanium Backup or similar
| {{No}} <ref>
[https://signal.org Signal] is such an example. People expected [https://www.titaniumtrack.com/titanium-backup.html Titanium Backup] to be able to backup the Signal app data but [https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/issues/8130#issuecomment-414780981 lost data]. [https://community.signalusers.org/t/howto-manual-backup-restore-if-full-backup-does-not-work/2462/print Extra steps are required for a Signal backup.] (Insturctions untested by author of this wiki page.)
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! Applications cannot refuse data backup (for purpose of malware, spyware analysis or backup and restore).
| {{No}} <ref>
Quote https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/manifest/application-element#allowbackup

<code>android:allowBackup</code>

<blockquote>
Whether to allow the application to participate in the backup and restore infrastructure. If this attribute is set to false, no backup or restore of the application will ever be performed, even by a full-system backup that would otherwise cause all application data to be saved via adb. The default value of this attribute is true.
</blockquote>
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=fullaccess />
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! No culture of users can ask device (code) for permission and device (code) will decide to grant or refuse the request.
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=fullaccess>If credentials can be provided (full disk encryption password if used), (super) root will have full access.</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! No culture of applications refusing to run if device is rooted.
| {{No}} <ref>
[https://android.stackexchange.com/questions/29359/how-to-prevent-applications-from-discovering-my-phone-as-being-rooted How to prevent applications from discovering my phone as being Rooted]
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! No culture of applications refusing to run if using a custom operating system (custom ROM).
| {{No}} <ref>
[https://www.howtogeek.com/241012/safetynet-explained-why-android-pay-and-other-apps-dont-work-on-rooted-devices/ How-To Geek: SafetyNet Explained: Why Android Pay and Other Apps Don’t Work on Rooted Devices]
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! User (privacy) settings are respected.
| {{No}} <ref>
[https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb/AP-Exclusive:-Google-tracks-your-movements,-like-it-or-not AP Exclusive: Google tracks your movements, like it or not]

<blockquote>Google wants to know where you go so badly that it records your movements even when you explicitly tell it not to.

An Associated Press investigation found that many Google services on Android devices and iPhones store your location data even if you’ve used a privacy setting that says it will prevent Google from doing so.

Computer-science researchers at Princeton confirmed these findings at the AP’s request.</blockquote></ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! WiFi off indicator means that WiFi is really off.
| {{No}} <ref>
* [https://qz.com/1169760/phone-data/ Google can still use Bluetooth to track your Android phone when Bluetooth is turned off]
* [https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-google-and-everyone-else-gets-wi-fi-location-data/ How Google--and everyone else--gets Wi-Fi location data]

<blockquote>How it works, according to Google, is that the Android Location Services periodically checks on your location using GPS, Cell-ID, and Wi-Fi to locate your device. When it does this, your Android phone will send back publicly broadcast Wi-Fi access points' Service set identifier (SSID) and Media Access Control (MAC) data. Again, this isn't just how Google does it; it's how everyone does it. It's Industry practice for location database vendors.</blockquote>
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! Bluetooth off indicator means that Bluetooth is really off.
| {{No}} <ref>[https://qz.com/1169760/phone-data/ Google can still use Bluetooth to track your Android phone when Bluetooth is turned off]</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! Prevention of targeted malicious upgrades. <ref>
As in singling out specific users. Shipping malicious upgrades to select users only.
</ref>
| {{No}} <ref name=targeted-updates>
Most android phones have a feature which allows to login on google play web/desktop version using the same e-mail address which is used on the phone. Usually the same gmail address. When clicking install for an app using the google play web/desktop version, the user will be prompter (in case of having registred multiple devices) on which device the app should be installed. After pressing install, the app will be installed on the phone. This [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HljSquJ7yCo video] demonstrates this. It is therefore established that the google website can result in remote app installation on the phone.

It follows that a coerced or compromised google play website could do the same. Since the gmail based web login can be linked to the same gmail address on the phone, pushing targeted malicious upgrades is esspecially easy. Even if a phone was always fully torified (all traffic routed over Tor) the gmail identifier could still be used. While Tor can anonymize the connection, it does not (and should not) attempt to modify anything inside the traffic (the gmail identifier).
</ref>
| ? <ref>
Probably same as Linux Desktop Distributions.
</ref>
| ? <ref>
Linux distributions usually do not require an e-mail based login to receive upgrades. Users can still be singled out by IP addresses unless users opt-in for using something such as apt-transport-tor which is not the default.
</ref>
| {{Yes}} <ref>
All upgrades are downloaded over Tor. There is no way for the server to ship legit upgrade packages to most users while singling out specific users for targeted attacks.
</ref>

|-
! Vendors do not sometimes introduce mitigations that introduce attack surface.
| {{No}} <ref>
Some Android vendors [https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/02/mitigations-are-attack-surface-too.html introduce mitigations that introduce attack surface].
</ref>
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|-
! The GNU Project does not state: "[https://www.gnu.org/proprietary/malware-apple.html Apple's Operating Systems Are Malware]" and "[https://www.gnu.org/proprietary/malware-google.html Google's Software is Malware]".
| {{No}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}}
| {{Yes}} <ref name=same-as-linux-desktop/>

|}
</div>

Quote [https://www.theregister.com/2020/03/06/1_billion_vulnerable_android_devices_which/ More than a billion hopelessly vulnerable Android gizmos in the wild that no longer receive security updates – research]. The operating system of these devices:

* Do not receive security upgrades from the vendor.
* Third parties (such as users or the modding community) cannot provide (security) upgrades either due to locked bootloaders, which cannot be unlocked due to vendor decision and due to unavailability of a security bug which could unlock the bootloader.
* Even if bootloaders can be unlocked there might not be an adequate operating system upgrades available from third parties, such as the modding community. Either due to unpopularity of the devices among modding developers and/or due to technical challenges.

Ability to upgrade (security fixes) devices; replace operating system; bootloader freedom vs bootloader non-freedom:

* iPhones and some Android devices have locked boot loaders that cannot be unlocked. This restricts user freedom and makes replacing the operating system impossible without a verified boot bypass exploit. In case the vendor deprecated security support for the device, the only choices users realistically have is to keep using an insecure device, or to buy a device which still has security support. Similarly, locked bootloaders also prevent gaining administrator (root) access.
* Some Android devices do allow unlocking the bootloader but not with custom verified boot keys, causing a decrease in security.
* Some Android devices (such as the Nexus or Pixel devices) support full verified boot with custom keys that can be used with alternative operating systems.

In conclusion, when using iPhone/Android devices that still receive security updates, the iPhone/Android approach provides strong protection against malware, meaning those platforms are impacted much less than Windows or Linux desktops. <ref name=exploitedapp /> Despite the many downsides ([[Mobile_Phone_Security#Mobile_Devices_Backdoors_in_Most_Phones_Tablets_Etc|Mobile Devices Backdoors in Most Phones Tablets Etc]], [[Mobile_Phone_Security#Data_Harvesting_by_Most_Phones|Data Harvesting by Most Phones]], ...), the security model of popular mobile operating systems often affords better protection when attempting to prevent any malicious and unapproved party from establishing a foothold in their ecosystem. In the process, the user's and the security community's ability to audit and control what their devices are actually doing is severely diminished. Due to a [[Miscellaneous_Threats_to_User_Freedom#Conflict_of_Interest|Conflict of Interest]] this comes at the expense of transferring power from the user to the developers, user freedom restrictions, [[Miscellaneous_Threats_to_User_Freedom#Freedom_vs_Tyrant_Security|Tyrant Security]], [[Miscellaneous_Threats_to_User_Freedom#War_on_General_Purpose_Computing|War on General Purpose Computing]].<noinclude>
{{Header}}
= Footnotes =
<references />
{{Footer}}
</noinclude>